Support Rod Coronado
> From: Support for Rod <info@supportrod.org>
Hello All!
This past weekend was one I could only have dreamed of; perhaps too cynical or
jaded by experience, I tend to leave idyllic adventures for my four year old
daughter’s bedtime. But, once again life has shown us that magic is abundant,
love is conquering, and that the design of life certainly has plans for us.
After a week of tumultuous events, Rod and I were wed on September 1, during
what was one of the most magical days of our lives. We were surrounded by our
loved ones, Earth warriors, community builders, blissful children, and the
spirit of the Earth, whom was sure to make herself known.
The week began with the arrival of some dear friends and family members, which
set a tone of support and strength. But, we also received a call from Rod’s
Probation Officer, who was very angry that he had attended a benefit in
Minnesota, even after we had permission from the court’s in San Diego. As it
turns out, the court’s here were not happy about that, and his PO
asked for him to be returned to prison for violating his terms of release.
I feel Rod is protected by all of the love that surrounds us now, for Judge Bury would not
violate him, although in the future it seems he may need to ask for permission
to attend such events. That was a huge SIGH* for us, as it would have been a
sad wedding for me without my partner……
Then came the next obstacle, how would we be allowed to have some of
our wedding guests, attendants, and our minister marry us since they all posed a risk of
violating Rod’s terms of probation? I don’t know how or why this worked out,
but the PO officer and the supervisor were willing to give us temporary ok to
associate with them for the time of the wedding. We prayed for that,
literally visualized and only believed that it would be that way, and when it
came time to ask that of the courts, we were granted the permission! They said,
“they felt like it was the human thing to do…” hmmm…. I have a few more
suggestions, but, I was more than pleased and we then knew that Creator was watching closely.
Rod went to San Diego on Friday, and although no major details were
decided on, as it was presented to me, things sound hopeful. (Rod has ANOTHER
InLIM hearing this Thursday…please attend!) Rod was not stressed or disturbed as
is the usual reaction to the appearances in San Diego, but was joyful and easily
reconnected back to the plans of the weekend, surrounded by family and friends, and an
abundance of joy!
Our hearts were so happy the entire weekend. I do not think we could
have been more sure about anything, as our testament to each other was so
obvious and true throughout the time. I have witnessed a lot of dramatic
emotions during such times, and it was so refreshing to have each other as
a source of peace and solace. We walked together in union right up to the
time of the wedding when then it was apparent that this relationship is far
bigger than us.
When we arrived at the Botanical Gardens, the weather was hot and sticky….real
hot and real sticky. There was much work to be done and not a lot of
time to do it in ( the story of our lives). As the ends were coming together, on the
distance an enormous black cloud began to show itself. Rolling
thunder began to sound, and I tried to remain unattached to the idea that
the party may be over before it started. We managed to do all the pictures,
and set up the table just in time for some rain to come down, which meant that all the
table clothes and chairs were soaked.
But…. as in Arizona, the storm passed…….or so it seemed. Ten minutes
before we began our entrance to the ceremony, the darkest clouds covered our head, and
lightning and thunder began to increase. We lit the sage and the children
walked up the path, blessing our way. We made it into the sacred circle right
as a light rain began to fall, and everyone, including Rod and myself were
overjoyed with the blessings of the West. We had a pipe blessing,
and then when our friend Peg began the invocation of the four directions, the winds
wiped, the lightening and thunder cracked, and we were all humbled by such a
display. As a friend said, “that should be in a movie!”
Once the wedding party left the ceremony site, the rains subsided and the sun
shown her face, and the chairs dried and the party began!
We thank everyone who was there to help us, we rejoice in the beauty
of all the hearts that opened so wide and shared with us that dear moment, and
we send our love for those who we wished to be with us, and could only be so
in spirit.
And after this week, we will walk hand in hand into the courtroom of Judge
Miller and believe that Creator will guide us so magnificently through the
trial, as we shown that these steps truly are part of a grander design.
I personally send my love and prayers out to the many along the way who have
been there to assure me that we are not alone, and I pray for healing to those
who may still appose us or see my family as a threat. I know that
what Rod and I do is about love, it is about a new way, and a future. It is not
about hurting, or destroying, any of the fearful places people sometimes reside. If
we can all experience these profound events that happen daily across
the planet, we shall be reminded that life is sweet, even when there is
suffering. Letting go of the past and walking into the future is the only way to
walk free; for Rod, for me, for the governments, for any human that hopes for
harmony….
We will see you on our honeymoon, San Diego, September 10, 2007. Please be
there, in body or spirit!
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1 comment:
statute under which he was charged, Title 18 USC sec. 842(p)(2)(A
Reasonable Doubt:
How can they be sure what you were thinking on a given day - what your state of mind was...
1.) INTENT -
The determination or resolve to do a certain thing, or the state of mind with which something is done. Need a Lawyer? Check Out The 'Lectric Law Library's Searchable Attorney Directory
2.) Intent; From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Intent in law is the planning and desire to perform an act, to fail to act (i.e. an omission) or to achieve a state of affairs.
In criminal law, for a given actus reus ("guilty act"), the requirement to prove intent consists of showing mens rea (mental state, "guilty mind").
The requirements for the proof of intent in tort law are generally simpler than criminal law.
Knowledge of the repercussions of the act is often not necessary. It is sometimes only a matter of showing that there was desire to perform an act.
See also: Letter and spirit of the law Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intent"
Categories: Criminal law | Tort law
3.) intent: From Wiktionary
[edit] Etymology- Existing since Middle English, from Old French entent or entente, ultimately from Latin intendere.
[The purpose of something that is intended.
(law) The state of someone’s mind at the time of committing an offence.
[edit] Translations The purpose of something that is intended[Show]
Finnish: aikomus, aie - Kurdish: ئامانج
The state of someone’s mind at the time of committing an offence[Show]
Finnish: aikomus
most intent
Firmly fixed or concentrated on something.
Engrossed.
Unwavering from a course of action.
[edit] Translations Firmly fixed or concentrated on something,Finnish: keskittynyt
Engrossed[Show]Finnish: keskittynyt
Unwavering from a course of action; Related terms[Show]
for all intents and purposes
intend
intense
intention
intensive
intent on
intently
to all intents and purposes
with intent
Retrieved from "http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/intent"
Categories: Middle English derivations | Old French derivations | Latin derivations | English nouns | Law | English adjectives
Is it Legal to Teach a Course on Computer Hacking?
In the United States, the Answer is Yes, Unless There is Specific Knowledge and Intention as to Crimes, And Unless Terrorism Is Abetted; By ANITA RAMASASTRY ---- Monday, Jul. 24, 2006
In Dundee, Scotland, Abertay University recently made headlines with the announcement that it is offering a degree in computer hacking! For some, this is like teaching a class in safecracking or burglary. But others strenuously disagree. The degree program is meant to teach "ethical" hacking - to educate white-hat hackers. Indeed, its promotional literature states "it takes a thief to catch a thief." Put another way, in order to know how to combat the enemy, you need to know how the enemy operates. No wonder, then, that consulting firms and companies train their own computer professionals about hacking.
The degree program nevertheless poses a significant risk: What if a black-hat hacker pretends to be a white-hat hacker, and signs up? The University has promised to work with the U.K. government to screen potential students to keep out black-hat hackers. But such screening will surely be imperfect. And some students may become black-hat hackers only after graduation. Still others may be tempted to commit some unauthorized or harmful hacking just for the fun of it.
In this column, I will consider the legal status - and advisability - if such a program were to be created in the United States. Along the way, I'll consider the similar - and provocative - question of the liability of those who may write about or teach terrorist tactics.
The First Amendment Protects Even Speech About How to Commit Crimes
In the U.S., such a course would be First Amendment-protected. But there would be limits to such protection. And such limits, in era of the "war on terror," are likely to be aggressively enforced. As the U.S. government becomes increasingly concerned, for example, about people using the Internet to incite terrorism, there has been increased scrutiny of who might be liable for assisting others to commit terrorist acts.
The First Amendment, for instance, does not prevent prosecution for aiding and abetting someone else's criminal acts. So suppose a professor knew a student was a black-hat hacker, and did not bar him or her from the class; conceivably, the professor could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting. But knowledge of a specific project for which the black-hat envisioned using the class information would probably be required. And at an extreme, if a hacking program could be shown to be a veritable school for crime, it might be shut down completely.
The Paladin Case Illustrates the Limits of First Amendment Protection for Crime Manuals
One key precedent that has caused publishers and journalists to worry is Rice v. Paladin. Paladin Press's first book was 150 Questions for a Guerrilla, by General Alberto Bayo, which discussed tactics of guerrilla warfare. Its current offerings include Advanced Lock Picking Secrets, How to Get in Anywhere Anytime and Drug Smuggling: The Forbidden Book. But its website does include a disclaimer: "WARNING: Paladin does not intend for any of the information contained in its books or videos to be used for illegal purposes."
Freedom of speech; From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: This article is about the general concept. For freedom of speech in specific jurisdictions, see Freedom of speech by country.
The examples and perspective in this article or section may not represent a worldwide view of the subject.
Please improve this article or discuss the issue on the talk page.
Part of a series on
Freedom
By concept
Philosophical freedom
Political freedom
Liberty
By form
Assembly
Association
Body: clothing, modifying
From government
Movement
Press
Religion and beliefs
Speech & expression
Thought
Other
Censorship
Coercion
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Positive liberty
Self-ownership: Freedom of speech is the concept of being able to speak freely without censorship. It is often regarded as an integral concept in modern liberal democracies. The right to freedom of speech is guaranteed under international law through numerous human rights instruments, notably under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, although implementation remains lacking in many countries. The synonymous term freedom of expression is sometimes preferred, since the right is not confined to verbal speech but is understood to protect any act of seeking, receiving and imparting information or ideas, regardless of the medium used.
In practice, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute in any country, although the degree of freedom varies greatly. Industrialized countries also have varying approaches to balance freedom with order. For instance, the United States First Amendment theoretically grants absolute freedom, placing the burden upon the state to demonstrate when (if) a limitation of this freedom is necessary. In almost all liberal democracies, it is generally recognized that restrictions should be the exception and free expression the rule; nevertheless, compliance with this principle is often lacking.
1 Theories of free speech
1.1 Overview
1.2 Self-governance
1.3 Discovering truth
1.4 Promoting tolerance
2 Restrictions on free speech
3 The Internet
4 Quotations
4.1 General
4.2 In support of free speech
4.3 In support of specific limits
5 See also
6 Research Resources
7 References
8 External links
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
was a United States
Supreme Court case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless it is directed to inciting and likely to incite imminent lawless action.
Background of the case Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader in rural Ohio, contacted a reporter at a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come and cover a KKK rally in Hamilton County. Portions of the rally were taped, showing several men in robes and hoods, some carrying firearms, first burning a cross and then making speeches. One of the speeches made reference to the possibility of "revengeance" against "niggers," "Jews," and those who supported them. One of the speeches also claimed that "our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race," and announced plans for a march on Washington to take place July 4. Brandenburg was later convicted of advocating violence under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute for his participation in the rally and for the speech he made. In relevant part, the statute proscribed "advocat[ing] .. . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." He was fined $1000 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. Brandenburg's conviction was affirmed by an Ohio appellate court despite his claim that the statute violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed his appeal without opinion. The rather cursory way in which the Ohio courts dismissed Brandenburg's constitutional arguments is unsurprising in light of the state of First Amendment law in the pre-Brandenburg era. Although Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), had overturned the convictions of mid-level Communist Party members in language that seemed suggestive of a broader view of freedom of expression rights than had been accorded them in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), all Yates purported to do was construe a federal statute, the Smith Act. Thus, Dennis's reading of the First Amendment remained in force: advocacy of law violation, even as an abstract doctrine, could be punished under law consistent with the Free Speech Clause.
[edit] The Court's decision The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg's conviction, holding that government cannot constitutionally punish abstract advocacy of force or law violation. The unanimous majority opinion was per curiam (issued from the Court as an institution rather than as authored and signed by an individual justice): it had originally been drafted by Justice Abe Fortas before he was forced to resign in the midst of an ethics scandal, and Justice William J. Brennan made only minor changes to the opinion before it was published. Justices Black and Douglas concurred separately.
[edit] Per curiam opinion The per curiam majority opinion overturned the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), and articulated a new test—the "imminent lawless action" test—for judging so-called seditious speech under the First Amendment: The Court upheld the statute on the ground that, without more, "advocating" violent means to effect political and economic change involves such danger to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it. Cf. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). But Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, at 507 (1951). These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
The three distinct elements of this test (intent, imminence, and likelihood) have distinct precedential lineages. Judge Learned Hand was possibly the first judge to advocate the intent standard, in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), reasoning that "[i]f one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation." The Brandenburg intent standard is more speech-protective than Hand's formulation, which contained no temporal element.
The imminence element was a departure from earlier rulings. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the Court had adopted a "clear and present danger" test that Whitney v. California had expanded to a bad tendency test: if speech has a "tendency" to cause sedition or lawlessness, it may constitutionally be prohibited. Dennis v. United States, a case dealing with prosecution of alleged Communists under the Smith Act for advocating the overthrow of the government, used the clear and present danger test while still upholding the defendants' convictions for acts that could not possibly have led to a speedy overthrow of the government. Brandenburg explicitly overruled the bad tendency test and made the time element of the clear and present danger test more defined and more rigorous.
Interestingly, the per curiam opinion cited to Dennis v. United States as though it were good law and amenable to the result reached in Brandenburg. In point of fact, Brandenburg essentially eviscerated Dennis's central holding and held that "mere advocacy" of any doctrine, including one that assumed the necessity of violence or law violation, was per se protected speech. It may be that principles of stare decisis figured in the Court's decision to avoid overruling the relatively recent Dennis, but the distance between the two cases' approach is obvious and irreconcilable.
[edit] Concurrences
Justice Hugo Black, renowned civil libertarian and First Amendment absolutist, filed a short concurrence indicating his agreement with Justice William O. Douglas's longer opinion and pointing out that the per curiam's reliance on Dennis was more symbolic than actual.
Justice Douglas's concurrence reflected the absolutist position that only he and Black ever fully subscribed to, namely that the phrase "no law" in the First Amendment ought to be interpreted very literally, and that all speech is immune from prosecution, regardless of the governmental interests advanced in suppressing some particular instance of speech. He briefly traced the history of the clear and present danger test, illustrating how it had been used over the years since its debut in Schenck to dismiss dozens of what Douglas viewed as legitimate First Amendment claims.
A short but interesting section of Douglas's opinion indicated that he might be open to allowing the government greater latitude in controlling speech during time of "declared war" (making clear that he was not referring to the then-current Vietnam conflict), although he only phrased that possibility in terms of doubt (as opposed to his certainty that the clear and present danger test was irreconcilable with the First Amendment during time of peace).
Douglas also pointed out the legitimate role of symbolic speech in First Amendment doctrine, using examples of a person ripping up a Bible to celebrate the abandonment of his faith or tearing a copy of the Constitution in order to protest a Supreme Court decision, and assailed the previous term's United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which had allowed for the prosecution of a man for burning his draft card. In all these situations, Douglas argued, an action was a vital way of conveying a certain message, and thus the action itself deserved First Amendment protection.
Finally, Douglas dealt with the classic example of a man "falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." In order to explain why someone could be legitimately prosecuted for this, Douglas called it an example in which "speech is brigaded with action." In the view of Douglas and Black, this was probably the only sort of case in which a person could be prosecuted for speech.
[edit] Subsequent developments
The Brandenburg test was the Court's last major statement on what government may do about inflammatory speech that seeks to incite others to lawless action. It resolved the debate between those who urged greater government control of speech for reasons of security and those who favored allowing as much speech as possible and relying on the marketplace of ideas to reach a favorable result, leaving the law in a state along the lines of that which Justices Louis Brandeis, and, post-Schenck, Oliver Wendell Holmes advocated in several dissents and concurrences during the late 1910s and early 1920s. As of 2007, the Brandenburg test is still the standard used for evaluating attempts to punish inflammatory speech, and it has not been seriously challenged since it was laid down in 1969. Very few cases have actually reached the Court during the past decades that would test the outer limits of Brandenburg, so the test remains largely unqualified.[edit] See alsoList of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 395
Dennis v. United States ; Whitney v. California
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
Text of decision (at FindLaw.com)
First Amendment Library entry on Brandenburg v. Ohio
Per Curiam Opinion (Cornell Law)
"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio"
Categories: 1969 in law | Court cases litigated by the American Civil Liberties Union |
United States First Amendment case law |
United States Supreme Court cases |
United States free speech case law
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